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In my 1981 postdoctoral thesis at the University of Tübingen, I focused on epikeia, an important virtue that for many centuries had o#en been forgotten. 
I chose this topic not merely out of historical interest, but because I intuited that 
it would be useful to shed light on complex moral situations and to help resolve 
particularly di$cult moral cases. !e book1 that ensued is still not available in 
English translation. However, the recent reprint in the Osservatore Romano of 
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger’s “Introduction” to the 1998 volume On the Pastoral 
Care of the Divorced and Remarried 2 occasioned the publication of this article in 
English. In his article, Pope Benedict XVI acknowledges the importance of epikeia 
and aequitas canonica in the realm of human and ecclesiastical law, not in divine 
law. However, he calls for further examination of the virtue since “admittedly, 
it cannot be excluded that mistakes occur in marriage cases.” He notes that “in 
some parts of the Church, well-functioning marriage tribunals still do not exist. 
Occasionally, such cases last an excessive amount of time. Once in a while they 
conclude with questionable decisions. Here it seems that the application of epikeia 
in the internal forum is not automatically excluded from the outset.”3 
 * Professor Emeritus Günter Virt, former professor of Moral !eology at the Universities 
of Tübingen, Paderborn, Salzburg and Vienna. Currently member of the European Group on 
Ethics.
 1 Günter Virt, Epikie- verantwortlicher Umgang mit Normen. Eine historisch-systematische 
Untersuchung zu Aristoteles, !omas von Aquin und Franz Suarez. Tübinger theologische Studien 
Bd. 21 (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald Verlag, 1983).
 2 “!e Pastoral Approach to Marriage Must Be Founded on Truth,” Osservatore Romano 
(Weekly Edition in English), 16 June 2012. 
 3 Ibid.
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 e virtue of epikeia is relevant for many issues that arise in contemporary 
society, including pastoral concerns in our parish communities, among which, a 
particularly di"cult one is the pastoral care of the divorced and remarried.
 is article will include two parts. First, I will focus on how the understanding 
of epikeia developed historically in order to present its various nuances 
systematically. I will clarify the di#erent nuances of the understanding of this 
virtue in three key authors representative of the tradition. Second, I will raise a 
number of questions for the further examination of the issue of the pastoral care 
of the divorced and remarried. 
An Overview of the History of Epikeia
To understand fully the meaning of this o$en-forgotten but important 
virtue, it is necessary to follow the historical development of the understanding 
of epikeia through the attempts made, at di#erent points in time, to apply it to 
concrete situations. As epikeia is applied to di#erent ethical questions in changing 
historical contexts, it receives variously nuanced interpretations. Accordingly, it 
is important to note how philosophical and theological developments in the 
understanding of epikeia are related to the political circumstances in which it 
was used. In this regard, my chosen method is both historical and systematic. 
 It is impossible in a short article such as this to cover the entire history of 
epikeia. erefore, I suggest that we concentrate on the three authors who have 
most contributed to its re%ection: Aristotle, St omas Aquinas and Francisco 
Suarez. 
‘Epikeia’ in Aristotle
Aristotle is the &rst philosopher to establish ethics as a discipline that can 
stand on its own and not merely as part of metaphysics, like Plato’s closed 
system of ideas. His three primary works on ethics are the Eudemic Ethics, the 
Magna Moralia and the Nicomachean Ethics, each o#ering a slightly di#erent 
interpretation of epikeia. His Rhetoric and Topics are also infused with ethics.4 
Aristotle summarises and integrates the Greek philosophers and thinkers before 
him. He is the &rst to clarify the concept of epikeia that until his time had 
remained fairly di#use. 
Aristotle starts his ethical re%ection with morals as a phenomenon 
exempli&ed in the tradition of his society. He speaks about the good praxis of 
his polis Athens. But Aristotle does not stop with morals as experienced. He 
 4 Virt., 74-77.
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seeks to understand the underlying reasons and foundations for that which he 
observes so sharply. In short, he establishes that virtue itself is the driving force 
for individuals and society to reach the goal of eudaimonia (frequently, but not 
adequately, translated as “happiness”, or in German, as Glück). 
When Aristotle ponders why people are o!en not virtuous, he comes to the 
conclusion that the “movements of the soul” are not in balance. While virtue 
is always to be found in the mean, it carries the potential to reach the highest 
nobility of character. So fortitude, the central virtue in Aristotle’s tradition, is 
the middle-point between fear on one side and blind audacity on the other (NE 
III, 9). He uses the same logic for the other important virtues, e.g. sophrosyne 
(sobriety NE III, 13), eleutheriotes (generosity NE IV, 1 " ), philotimia (love 
of honour NE IV, 7), and even dikaiosyne (justice NE V, 1" ). e very use of 
this logical schema implies that Plato’s idealistic plan of the “spheres of the soul,” 
from which he deduces the schema of the four cardinal virtues, is not su$cient 
for a serious consideration of the whole history of moral thought. 
Halfway through his Nicomachean Ethics, before he proceeds to the dianoetic 
virtues in NE VI, Aristotle concludes his presentation of the ethical virtues, 
and his argument on the virtue of justice in particular, with a consideration of 
epikeia (in NE V, 15; 1137b26). His leading question is: why is it that in certain 
circumstances, those who follow the law (nomos) rigidly (Greek: akribodikaios) 
can be unjust, while those who do not follow the letter of the law, can be just? 
He answers with the virtue of epikeia that in earlier thinkers had taken di"erent 
meanings: 
In Homer, the adjective epieikes expresses moral temperance and decency. It 
is an ideal characteristic of the gods (Zeus, Hera etc.) and of heroes (such as 
Achilles). 
In Herodotus, epikeia is the opposite of the rigorous defence of one’s right. 
In the Sophist Gorgias, epikeia is a dynamic element of justice useful to 
overcome dilemmas. In the process, the human subject creates his own kairos. In 
contrast, for the historiographer ucydides, kairos is supra-individual. He sees 
history as the combination of destiny and reason, and criticises the Athenians for 
using epikeia in situations of war as a means of power politics.5
In Plato, epieikes as adjective usually has a positive ring, but epikeia as a noun 
is a dilution of justice. Most commentaries are based on a sentence in Plato’s 
(possibly posthumous) work Nomoi (VI 757d-e), where he criticizes the election 
for o$ces for not being based on virtue and talent, but rather, for being simply 
by lot. Here, the term epikeia implies a weakening of justice.
 5 Ibid., 61-69.
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However, simultaneously, Plato strongly supports the content of epikeia as 
respect for the individual human being’s complex situation. Plato realises that 
the law can regulate justice only in a general way. In his !rst dialogue on the state, 
Politeia, only the wise philosopher-king has full insight and awareness of the 
idea of the good and just. He needs no law because he knows what is right and 
just for each situation. In his second dialogue, Politikos, Plato is more realistic. 
e state needs laws, although the law is very general and can never regulate 
the complexity of life and all concrete situations. In his third dialogue about 
the state, Nomoi, Plato does not aim for the ideal state, but seeks to avoid the 
worst possible state of tyrannis. In this case, only the judge is allowed to !ll in 
the lacunae of the law to serve the intention of the law. In no case is the normal 
citizen allowed to use epikeia.6
Within this long and rather confused tradition of epikeia, Aristotle narrows 
down the problem of understanding epikeia (in NE V, 14) to a sharp ‘trilemma’: 
when justice is determined by law, then epikeia can only be a dilution (ellatosis) of 
justice; when justice is not su#ciently determined by the law, then the law needs 
to be improved (epanorthoma) by epikeia, and epikeia becomes the real justice; or 
justice and epikeia are equivalent.
Aristotle solves this trilemma by arguing that there is some truth to all three 
positions. Epikeia is inseparable from justice. But justice is only partly, and not 
completely, upheld by the law. e di$erence is not absolute due to the limitations 
of legal discourse. No law can cover all the conditions for its validity, as life is 
full of extraordinary circumstances that legislation cannot consider in advance. 
us, Aristotle concludes that epikeia is an aspect of justice, yet superior to the 
letter of the law. Epikeia supplements the law in concrete situations that re%ect 
extraordinary circumstances. erefore epikeia is the better form of justice.
But who is entitled to practice epikeia? In contrast to his teacher Plato, 
Aristotle deems that every citizen can practice epikeia, because in Athens, the 
!rst democracy in the world, every free citizen is a potential legislator. 
Why does this virtue belong to all? Aristotle gives his answer in his 
deliberations about practical reasoning and the dianoetic virtues in NE VI. First, 
he distinguishes between theoretical and practical reasoning. en, he notes 
that practical reasoning includes three elements. e !rst is phronesis, the human 
ability to create norms for moral guidance in the realm of daily choices. Related 
to phronesis is synesis, the critical attitude to laws and norms and the ability to 
judge whether a law is just or unjust. e third element is gnome, the ability to 
understand in which extraordinary circumstances epikeia is at stake (NE VI, 11). 
 6 Ibid., 69-74.
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e criterion for the virtue of epikeia is syngnome, which is the ability to bring 
one’s gnome in relation with another person’s gnome. So, many times epikeia calls 
for greater duty and commitment from the other person than the letter of the 
law. Aristotle knows that o!en the root of injustice is greed and abuse of power; 
hence the necessity for the consistent application of the law. Consequently, 
epikeia o!en comes across as leniency or clemency. However, this is not the basis, 
though it can be understood as the consequence, of a careful consideration of 
justice in extraordinary circumstances.7
In contrast to his teacher Plato, who also respects individual circumstances, 
Aristotle sees this ability not only in the philosopher-king or in the competence 
of the lawyer as epikeia from above, but as a virtue of every citizen - epikeia from 
below. Contrary to his teacher Plato, Aristotle bases his ethical reasoning not 
within a system of ideas, which, can lead to a totalitarian state.8 Instead, Aristotle 
establishes what is moral by looking at the most honourable and ethical traditions 
(aner spoudaios, the “noble man”). us, Aristotle’s reasoning is open to new 
moral phenomena in the future. erefore, St omas will be able to draw on 
Aristotle and develop further what Aristotle began.
Indeed, one wonders if some of the tensions and di"culties in our church 
today could not be related precisely to the di#erent nuances of these two schools 
of thought: Plato versus Aristotle, which continue playing out through the 
centuries.
e virtue of epikeia played an important role in Greek culture. A!er the 
demise of the $rst democracy, the subsequent monarchic and o!en despotic 
political systems restricted epikeia to an occasional attitude of leniency on the 
part of the ruler (cf. “mirror of princes”, for example, in the Letter of Aristeas).
‘Epikeia’ in St !omas Aquinas    
It was only in the Middle Ages that epikeia was rediscovered by the great 
theologians St Albert the Great and St omas Aquinas. 
St omas’ most mature and comprehensive work, the Summa !eologiae, 
is the starting point to our understanding of his teaching on epikeia. We get a 
$rst glimpse of the signi$cance for omas of epikeia in those passages where he 
re%ects speci$cally on the virtue. Quaestio 120 of the Secunda Secundae o#ers 
the essence or skeleton of his teaching on epikeia, but the %esh can be gleaned 
 7 Ibid., 77-83.
 8 For example, Plato’s account of the invasion of Sicily, where the attempt to establish a 
totalitarian state model went horribly wrong, or by in%icting capital punishment on people not 
attending religious service.
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through many other quaestiones in the Summa where he deals with the problem 
without using the word epikeia, as well as in his many biblical commentaries and 
other works, where he associates epikeia with aequitas to give it a richer meaning.
St !omas’ thinking process moves from the general to the particular 
“concrete” reality. Quaestio 120 of the Secunda Secundae concludes his exposition 
on the virtue of justice by discussing epikeia in two articles. From this movement 
we can conclude that for St !omas epikeia is the most concrete form of justice.
St !omas presents an ethics of virtue. So the "rst article of Quaestio 120 of the 
Secunda Secundae is on whether epikeia is, in fact, a virtue. A#er three objections 
he states that epikeia is a virtue, because it is the attitude related to the moral 
action, which is always consistent with a single and contingent object (S.!.II-II 
120.1, ad 3: “actus humani, de quibus leges dantur, in singularibus contingentibus 
consistunt, quae in!nitis modis variari possunt, non fuit possibile, aliquam regulam 
legis institui, quae in nullo casu de!ceret”). Circumstances vary in"nitely, but laws 
are made for moral actions that happen under normal circumstances (ibid.: “sed 
legislatores attendunt ad id, quod in pluribus accidit, secundum hoc leges ferentes; 
quam tamen in aliquibus casibus servare est contra aequalitatem iustitiae et contra 
bonum commune, quod lex intendit”). It is thus not possible to formulate a law 
that is right in every case (ibid.: “non fuit possible aliquam regulam legis institutui, 
quae in nullo casu de!ceret”). Only tautologically or negatively formulated norms 
(and even then, mostly implicitly tautologically) have no exceptions one could 
think of. Sometimes to follow the letter of the law goes against the sense of justice 
and the common good which the law implies (ibid.: “quam tamen in aliquibus 
casibus servare est contra aequalitatem iustitiae et contra bonum commune quod lex 
intendit”). In other cases, following the law could even be evil.
St !omas refers to an old example: the law says that a deposited object must 
be returned when the owner asks for it. But if the owner of a weapon is in a 
rage when he asks for it back, and there is a serious danger that he could harm 
someone, it is not right to follow the norm. In this case it is good to neglect the 
law and to follow, what is called, the “sense of justice” (ibid.: “Sicut lex instituit, 
quod deposita reddantur quia hoc ut in pluribus iustum est; contigit tamen 
aliquando esse nocivum, puta si furiosus deposuit gladium et eum reposcat dum est 
in furia…bonum autem est praetermissis verbis sequi id quod poscit  iustitiae ratio 
et communis utilitas. Et ad hoc ordinatur epieikeia, quae apud nos dicitur aequitas. 
Unde patet, quod epieikeia est virtus”).  
In the second article of Quaestio 120, !omas asks whether epikeia is part 
of justice, and if so, in which way? He answers that epikeia is the pars subiectiva, 
which means, that it is the essential part (S.!.II-II 120.2, ad 3: “unde patet quod 
epieikeia est pars subiectiva iustitiae. Et de ea iustitia per prius dicitur quam de 
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legali: nam legalis iustitia dirigitur secundum epieikeiam. Unde epieikeia est quasi 
superior regula humanorum actuum”). Epikeia is the higher rule for human 
actions. 
To fully understand this extraordinary claim it is necessary to re%ect on how 
omas conceives the process of lawmaking in several steps: 
At the basis of normative reasoning is the highest ethical principle “to do the 
good and avoid evil.” As the rst step along the path to make this formal principle 
concrete, omas refers to the so-called inclinationes naturales – the essential 
purposes of life: self preservation, preservation of the species, cognition and 
community. e next step in this open eld of ethical reasoning is to determine, 
or conclude, which of the di$erent possibilities should be chosen on the basis of 
such criteria as empirical facts. Based on this re%ection one formulates the law. 
us, the product of this process of reasoning is the human concrete law. 
ere are two meanings of “natural law”. First, St omas calls “natural law” 
the process of this norm-giving reasoning. Second, only the highest principles 
in this process are immutable, and thus, “natural law” in the strict sense. Other 
norms are called “secondary natural law” because concrete human nature is 
always changeable (S.. II-II 57. 2:  “natura autem hominis mutabilis est. et ideo 
id quod naturale est homini potest aliquando de!cere”). 
Now we can understand what omas means when he says, that epikeia is a 
higher rule of justice than the law. e law is the product of a process of ethical 
and juridical reasoning. In extraordinary circumstances the letter of the law is not 
valid, because it violates the higher principles. In such cases, it becomes necessary 
to follow the higher principles, e.g. the common good, over and above the law 
(“praeter legem”) through arriving at a better conclusion or determination. So it 
is not the intention of the legislator that is crucial, but the person’s own practical 
reasoning and insight. Nevertheless, at times St omas adds the side argument 
that in certain cases the legislator would have decided in the same way if he were 
present and, indeed, when possible, he should be asked. 
Who has the competence for this practical reasoning? How does St omas 
frame this practical reasoning? When St omas talks about prudence, he has 
every human being in mind. He follows Aristotle when he explicates further 
that gnome is an important part (“pars potentialis”) of prudence with the specic 
ability to discern which cases are not to follow the common law (S..II-II  48.1: 
“gnome, quae est circa iudicium  eorum in quibus oportet quandoque a communi 
lege recedere”). 
In Quaestio 120 of the Secunda Secundae St omas lays down the skeleton 
(basics) of his concept of epikeia and follows Aristotle in noting that epikeia 
is justice in particular cases. But he goes beyond Aristotle when we take into 
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account that St !omas integrates aequitas in this concept of epikeia (“epieikeia, 
quae apud nos dicitur aequitas”). He does not integrate aspects of Roman Law 
directly in the Greek concept of epikeia, but through the Corpus Iuris Civilis of 
Justinian. More importantly, !omas’ understanding of aequitas is the same that 
emerges in many passages of his biblical commentaries. Aequitas appears not as a 
principle, but as a method of balancing. 
Aequitas-epikeia respects objective extraordinary circumstances as well as the 
inner condition of the person. !is is evident in !omas’ interpretation of the 
Psalms for instance, where he says that aequitas is a judgement not only about 
the extraordinary objective circumstances, but also about the personal inner 
condition. (In Ps 42:1, “… est duplex iudicium: scilicet severitatis, et misericordiae 
seu aequitatis. Primum est, quando attenditur solum res et non conditio; et hoc est 
timendum…secundum est, quando consideratur non solum natura rei, sed conditio 
personae”). Only God is able to fully grasp aequitas-epikeia, but the human person 
created in God’s image (“imago Dei”) has the ability to partake of this double 
cognition and recognition of extraordinary outer and inner circumstances 
(“conditio personae”).9
We can see that St !omas goes beyond Aristotle by including from his 
theological background the inner condition of the person (Personengerechtigkeit). 
St !omas’ perspective is grounded most decisively in the doctrine of the human 
person as created in the image of God. Epikeia-aequitas is for St !omas the 
highest realisation of justice. 
In St !omas we "nd the most distinguished and clear concept of epikeia. Only 
St Albert the Great went slightly beyond St !omas in his examples for epikeia, 
as found in his commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics and the Bible. One of these examples, found in his commentary 
on Aristotle (Super Ethica V) shows this quite clearly. Law forbids adultery. But if 
committing adultery with the wife of a tyrant is the only possibility to "nd out about 
the domestic habits of the tyrant-husband whom one seeks to assassinate, then this 
could be seen as an expression of the virtue of epikeia from a civil aspect. (Super 
Ethica V: … “lex praecipit non adulterandum, sed epieikes committit adulterium 
cum uxore tyranni, ut contrahat familiaritatem et possit tyrannum inter!cere”). In a 
number of his biblical commentaries, St Albert describes Jesus Christ as a model of 
epikeia (“Christus exemplum”). is is especially evident in Jesus’ con#ict with the 
Pharisees which Albertus Magnus interprets as an attitude of epikeia (Evangelium 
Joannis cap V, 16). Jesus is the model of epikeia par excellence.10 
 9 Ibid., 124-141; 158-168.
 10 Ibid., 154-158.
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From St !omas to Francisco Suarez
ere is good reason why I have chosen Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) as the 
next paradigmatic thinker on epikeia. He lived in the beginning of the Modern 
Age and was very in#uential in the shaping of Canon Law and moral theology. 
With Suarez we can observe how the ethical and theological questions changed. 
For St omas and the High Scholastic theologians, the leading question was 
of how God created the world and how the human being can return back to 
God from whom he originated (“exitus-reditus”) through the way opened up 
by Christ’s work of redemption. e answer was given in an ethics of virtue 
(“ultimum potentiae” was an expression of virtue in St omas). 
Francisco Suarez, one of the most prolific thinkers of the Spanish late 
Scholastic period, worked in the central administration of the empire “in 
which the sun did not set.” He was the counsellor of King Philip II, who 
appointed Suarez as professor at the University of Coimbra for political 
reasons. 
Francisco Suarez’ main work is titled Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore. 
Even from the title we can see that for Suarez, God as Supreme Lawmaker 
becomes central and thus, the image of God as legislator becomes dominant. 
e problems of the time were no longer answered by an ethics of virtue, but 
by an ethics of laws. Canon Law, civil law and ethics become blurred. 
Before we focus on Suarez’ teaching on epikeia, we have to take into 
consideration how epikeia was applied in politics. is historical consideration 
is important to understand Suarez’ notion and application of epikeia. While 
nothing new happened in the theological re#ection on epikeia, in the 14th and 
15th centuries, the virtue was applied in the crisis of the Western Schism of the 
two Popes. e schism of two Popes divided not only governments, but even 
religious orders, chapters and families; in other words, the whole Church. e 
Via Concilii was proposed to overcome the Schism. But a Council could be 
legitimate only when convened by a Pope. What could be done when neither 
Pope was willing to do this? e concept of epikeia was introduced by various 
important theologians, like Konrad von Gelnhausen (Epistula concordiae, 1380), 
Heinrich von Langenstein, and Johannes Gerson who interpreted epikeia as a 
“biological function” in the body of Christ and as a gi# of the Holy Spirit. In the 
Council of Basel, Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464) became the intellectual leader 
of the conciliarists. Later, he changed his mind and held that epikeia is reserved 
only for the Pope. It is possible that this led to anxiety about recommending the 
use of epikeia.11 !is historical note is important to understand Suarez’ context, 
 11 Ibid., 176-179.
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which was dominated by an anxiety and fear that the application of epikeia could 
undermine authority.
Suarez’ own teaching on epikeia was very broad and sophisticated. Already in 
his lectures in Rome, Suarez showed interest in epikeia and criticised St omas, 
because in his mind, the latter did not distinguish between the act and object of 
epikeia. In his critique of St !omas, Suarez di"ers on some points, but also does 
not quote St !omas precisely. !is is more than a terminological di"erence. 
Suarez’ mode of thinking is deductive from the dominium altum of the state over 
the property and life of subordinate persons. Suarez comes to the conclusion 
that epikeia is not a virtue in itself. His understanding of epikeia is in#uenced 
more by Plato than Aristotle and St !omas. !is preference was to in#uence 
the course of history, since epikeia was no longer esteemed as a virtue, nor was it 
understood as the competence of every person. 
Suarez’ late ten-volume work De legibus ac Deo legislatore  (About the Laws 
and God as Legislator) belongs more to law than to ethics, although no clear 
distinction is made. He deals with epikeia mostly as an act “contra verba legis”, and 
not as a virtue that under certain conditions dares to act “praeter verba legis”, as 
St !omas had said. Suarez emphasises legal certainty more than justice, and the 
legislator’s will more than reason. Put simply, Suarez shi$s epikeia from a virtue, 
to a sophisticated interpretation of the law in extraordinary circumstances when 
the law is too generic. Unlike Aristotle and Aquinas, who understood epikeia 
as belonging to every rational human being, Suarez maintained that only legal 
experts are entitled to act in the sense of epikeia.
Epikeia is obligatory when obedience to the law is immoral. Epikeia is possible 
when obedience to the law is not reasonable (e.g. the burden is too heavy), or 
whenever the legislator intends the law not to bind in speci%c circumstances 
(Leg VI, 7: ... “ita tres modi vel rationes utendi epieikeia distingui possunt, ut 
unus sit propter cavendum aliquid iniquum, alius propter vitandam acerbam et 
injustam obligationem , tertius propter conjectatam legislatoris voluntatem, non 
obstante potestate”). A$er his many distinctions, Suarez presents the interesting 
conclusion: it is by all means necessary to observe every single aspect, so that 
a prudent judgement can be made (Leg VI, 7,14: … “et in universum loquendo 
omnia sunt consideranda ut prudens iudicium in contingenti casu feratur”).
So epikeia still has some relation to virtue, but is no longer a virtue in itself. Now, 
epikeia belongs partly to justice, partly to prudence and partly to temperance. 
In relation to St !omas, Suarez narrows down the content of epikeia in two 
ways. !e realm of epikeia is not the whole area of law, but only the laws of the 
state. For St !omas epikeia was the virtue that enabled everybody to act “praeter 
legem” in extraordinary circumstances through recourse to higher principles. 
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When Suarez quotes St omas, he uses “contra legem” in the sense of acting 
against the law of the state. For Suarez it is impossible to act independently of the 
legislator, because the binding power of law comes from the will and intention of 
the legislator. Everyday life became regulated by laws overall. 
It is interesting to note that in the 18th century the patron saint of moral 
theologians, St Alphonsus Maria de Liguori, mainly follows Suarez in his 
!eologia Moralis (the !rst of seventy editions published in 1748). ere is one 
exception, however, when in !eologia Moralis lib. 1, tractatus 2, caput 4, nr 201 
he states: “Epieikeia est exceptio casus ob circumstantias, ex quibus certo vel saltem 
probabiliter judicatur, legislatorem noluisse illum casum sub legi comprehendi… 
haec epieikeia non solum habet locum in legibus humanis, sed etiam in naturalibus, 
ubi actio possit ex circumstantiis a malitia denudari.” Epikeia is an exceptional 
case in particular circumstances, only when there is a certainty or a probability 
that the legislator did not include this case in the law … but epikeia not only takes 
place in human law, but also in natural law, when a person’s acting is not wrong 
in itself.12 
For a correct understanding of epikeia in the realm of natural law one has 
to take into account the ambiguity of lex naturalis as recta ratio or as concrete 
formulation of derived natural law in the sense of St omas. Natural law 
understood as recta ratio has no exceptions; every exception would mean that 
not recta ratio is recta ratio - a contradiction in terms. But, as the examples 
show, natural law understood as derived from principles (secondary natural 
law) can fail in extraordinary situations.  It is also necessary to explain what is 
intrinsice malum vis-à-vis the seven di#erent meanings of intrinsice malum in 
our tradition.13
As an example, of the relevance of epikeia on the political level at that time, I 
would like to refer to an interesting regulation in my country, Austria, installed 
under the Empress Maria eresia (empress from 1740-1780). Whoever dared 
to neglect the order of a superior or the law (e.g. in military context) and was 
successful in his action was honoured with the highest merit. is is a clear 
instance when epikeia was applied in politics. is highest national award 
(Maria-!eresien-Orden) was given 1,243 times until the end of the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire in 1918.14
 12 Ibid., 233f.
 13 Werner Wolbert, Gewissen und Verantwortung (Fribourg: Herder, 2009), 234 distinguishes 
among seven di#erent meanings of intrinsece malum.
 14 “Militär-Maria-eresien-Orden,” Wikipedia, accessed 20 August 2012, http://de.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Militär-Maria-eresien-Orden.  
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From the mid-19th century to the Second Vatican Council, the manuals of 
Neo-Scholasticism dominated the teaching of moral theology. ese manuals 
favoured (or even pushed forward) a school of thought di"erent from the High 
Scholasticism of St omas.
In these manuals, which focused on obedience to authorities and the law, 
epikeia played a marginal role.15 When epikeia is mentioned at all, it is in the 
context of Church Law, such as regulation for fasting in lent, or in the liturgy. I 
give you an example and an anecdote.  
As an application of epikeia, J. Mayrhofer’s !eologiae moralis christiano-
catholicae principia16 gives the example of an old and frail woman being exempted 
from the obligation to attend mass on Sunday if the road is too dirty or if she has 
no suitable clothes. 
During an oral examination at the Gregorian University in Rome the well-
known Jesuit Prof. Franz Hürth asked a student from the United States what 
is epikeia. As usual he adjusted his watch to grant the student exactly $%een 
minutes to answer the question. No answer was given, but a%er fourteen 
minutes of silence the student began to smile and said: epikeia is some kind of 
biretta (epieikeia est aliqua species biretti). A little surprised, Prof. Hürth asked 
why, and the student replied that he had read in a liturgical book: when no 
biretta is available epikeia should be applied (si non adest birettum, adhibeatur 
epikeia). 
From cases like these, we can see that epikeia was applied only to trivial or even 
absurd cases. !e authentic understanding of the virtue of epikeia as established 
by St !omas was forgotten in Neo-!omism. !e legalistic approach of Neo-
Scholastic moral theology was to overshadow the genuine ethical dimension of 
epikeia. 
In the horrible times of German National Socialism, Rudolf Egenter, 
Professor of Moral !eology in Munich, dared to revive the concept of epikeia 
in the rich sense of St !omas in an article published in 1940.17 !is position 
was dangerous since R. Egenter explained that epikeia is not the recourse to 
the intention of the legislator. !e legislator in power at that time was Adolf 
Hitler. Like Egenter, other mostly German theologians ( J. Fuchs, J. Giers, W. 
Schöllgen, B. Häring, F. Dingjahn, and E. Hamel) deplored the fact that epikeia 
 15 Virt., 234-244.
 16 Josef Mayrhofer, eologia moralis christiano-catholicae principia, e probatissimis auctoribus 
in usum et subsidum cleri dioecesani Jaurinensis collecta et curae pastoralis regulis adaucta: De 
actibus humanis, de lege et conscientia, de peccato et censura, vol. 1 ( Jaurini: Sauervein, 1863), 243.
 17 Richard Egenter, “Über die Bedeutung der Epikie im sittlichen Leben,” Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch 53 (1940): 115-127.
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was a forgotten or marginalised concept, but they did not nd enough resonance 
in the public arena of Church and society.18
In the same context, Karl Hörmann, Professor of Moral eology and 
chairperson of the eological Committee of the Austrian Bishops’ Conference, 
published the deliberations of this committee in the book, Kirche und zweite 
Ehe (Church and Second Marriage).19 In this book, Hörmann launched epikeia 
as a project that needs to be studied further for the pastoral application of 
the divorced and remarried. is position was strongly contested by Canon 
Law experts, who interpreted epikeia only as linked to the intention of the 
legislator.20 Karl Hörmann responded that this position of Canon Law is only 
one of many interpretations of this concept and called for a systematic study of 
the history and concept of epikeia.  I took up the challenge from my predecessor 
and embarked on my postdoctoral thesis in Tübingen, published in my book 
Epikeia: Responsible Use of Norms.
!e Quest for Pastoral Solutions that are Ethically and 
!eologically Founded:  Applying Epikeia 
As good pastors we seek pastoral solutions to the very complex situations 
of divorced and remarried Catholics. Josef Ratzinger suggests that epikeia is a 
sound extra-juridical and theological tool for pastoral solutions.21 
Which of the Di!erent Philosophical and eological Models 
Discussed in the Article can be Helpful?
Is Plato’s model helpful, when only the Philosopher-King or, in his later 
works, the Judge, is entitled to consider extraordinary life circumstances?  
Can the model of Aristotle be useful, with his rich concept of epikeia, that is not a 
norm opposed to the law, but an improvement to the law in extraordinary circumstances? 
Is everybody entitled to the virtue of epikeia using his/her practical reasoning, 
namely sophrosyne, synesis and gnome? Does this di!erentiation of practical 
reasoning assist our re"ection?
 18 Virt., 249-255.
 19 Karl Hörmann, Kirche und zweite Ehe - Um die Zulassung wiederverheirateter Geschiedener 
zu den Sakramenten (Innbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 1973).
 20 Karl eodor Geringer, “Review of K. Hörmann,” Österreichisches Archiv für Kirchenrecht 
25 (1974): 296.
 21 Josef Ratzinger, “Zur Frage nach der Unau"öslichkeit der Ehe,” in Ehe und Ehescheidung. 
Diskussion unter Christen, eds. Franz Henrich and Volker Eid (München: Kösel Verlag, 1972), 
54.
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Can the tradition of the Orthodox Church of application of the law in 
a so! way through the principle of oikonomia suggest possible solutions? e 
Orthodox tradition follows the Platonic insight of considering extraordinary 
cases only through the exercise of authority and is understood as clemency.
Can St omas help us with his concept of epikeia as taking recourse to the 
higher ethical principles of practical reasoning (“superior regula humanorum 
actuum”)? 
Can St omas help us with his expanded concept of epikeia-aequitas as 
explained in his biblical commentaries, where he pleads for consideration of 
all extraordinary external and internal circumstances of the person (“conditio 
personae”)?
Can St Albert the Great help us with his insight that Jesus Christ is the model 
of epikeia? Is it helpful to ask how Jesus Christ would decide in a particular 
situation? 
Can Francisco Suarez help us with his criteria for epikeia, especially in the 
extraordinary situations when the burden of law is unreasonable, or the intent of 
the legislator is not to bind?
As St omas believed, could epikeia become a dynamic principle of justice 
when extraordinary single cases become more frequent - a possible indicator that 
life patterns are changing (S I-II  97)?
Essential ethics, derived from the essence of human nature is only one part 
of ethics and must be complemented by existential ethics, e.g. in the tradition 
of the Exercitia spiritualia of St Ignatius. Keeping in mind that epikeia 
generally demands that one takes seriously into account all inner and external 
circumstances in order to do justice to another person, epikeia demands more 
than the fullment of the letter of the law. is approach seems analogous to the 
“magis” of the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius of Loyola. Accordingly, one must 
raise the question: Is epikeia the bridge between essential ethics and existential 
ethics?22
Against this Rich Historical Background, the Following Points 
also Need to be Considered
Jesus’ teaching on marital faithfulness and the indissolubility of marriage as 
reported in the New Testament in ve slightly di$erent passages (Mk 10:11; 
Mt 5:32; Mt 19:9; Lk 16:18 and 1 Cor 7:15), with some exceptions, re%ects the 
 22 Karl Rahner, “Über die Frage einer formalen Existentialethik,” in Schri!en zur "eologie 
2 (Zürich: Benziger, 1962), 227-246; Bernhard, Fraling, “Existentialethik-spirituelle Mitte der 
Moraltheologie,” Geist und Leben 70 (1997): 12-28.
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special application of the word of Jesus Christ in the dierent local churches. 1 
Cor 7:12-15 is a clear example of the application of epikeia in the Scriptures.
It took the Church more than 1,000 years to realise and articulate fully that 
marriage is a sacrament.
!e axiom that gratia supponit naturam holds even for sacramental law and 
the ius divinum is made concrete as it is embedded in historical circumstances.  
!e requirement of canonical form (Tametsi) was established at the Council 
of Trent.
An important evolution in the teaching about marriage culminated in the 
Second Vatican Council with the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, 47-51. 
Most importantly, in Gaudium et Spes 48, the traditional term “marital contract” 
was changed to “marital covenant”. Marriage as a whole with all its consequences 
is considered a sacrament, and not only the juridical contract sanctioned during 
the church wedding ceremony.
!e praxis of the Rota Romana has changed e.g. with regards to the 
psychological impediments considered for marriage annulment.
!e tension between the two main schools of Bologna (contract theory, 
contractus facit nuptias) and Paris (consummation theory, consummatio facit 
nuptias) continues to play a background role today. How problematic is the 
equation between contract and sacrament?23
Dierent dioceses seem to apply dierent regulations for pastoral praxis.
!e Code of Canon Law (1983) assumes the logic of epikeia not only in the 
very last canon 1752, where aequitas canonica refers to the highest principle of 
the “salvation of souls” (salus animarum). 
During the 1980 Synod of Bishops in Rome24 a number of bishops exhorted 
the Church to "nd a pastoral solution for the increasing number of divorced and 
remarried Catholics and to distinguish carefully among the dierent situations 
(proposition 14, 1-6). 
Christians from the Orthodox churches can receive Holy Communion in the 
Catholic Church under certain circumstances.25 !is seems also valid in those 
 23 Eberhard Schockenho, Chancen zur Versöhnung? Die Kirche und die wiederverheirateten 
Geschiedenen (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 2011), 145. 
 24 !e Fi#h Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops met in Rome to discuss the 
Christian family from September 26 to October 25, 1980. !e Propositions that ensued were 
not o$cially published. 
 25 Ponti"cal Council for Promoting Christian Unity, Directory for the Application of Principles 
and Norms on Ecumenism, 25 March, 1993, accessed January 2013, http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/general-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_19930325_
directory_en.html, 125.
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cases which, through the oikonomia principle, were reconciled in their church 
and received a second marriage.
Only a!er a lot of pastoral experience through epikeia praeter legem did Pope 
Paul VI modify the rules for mixed marriages in the 1970 Apostolic Letter 
Matrimonia Mixta (e.g. the formulation for the obligation of Catholic education 
of children in mixed marriages).
A!er the publication of the Encyclical Humanae Vitae, thirty-eight episcopal 
conferences tried to show in their pastoral letters, how in extraordinary 
circumstances where the faithful cannot follow the norm, they can follow their 
conscience - as long as they are ready to form their conscience.
e societal circumstances of marriage have changed, are changing and will 
continue to change.
e Magisterium may not have spoken the last word on the situation of 
the divorced and remarried and their admission to the sacraments. Familiaris 
Consortio 84 stresses that pastors “are obliged to exercise careful discernment 
of situations” and hence to distinguish among di#erent cases of divorce and 
remarriage. John Paul II emphasised that this is a question of truth. What 
conclusions can be drawn?
e Magisterium never spoke about an obligation to mistrust the serious and 
proven judgement of conscience (Gaudium et Spes, 16 and Veritatis Splendor 59).
Towards a Solution for Accumulated orny Issues 
It is within the nature of problems, that sometimes there are no clear-cut 
solutions, especially for all diverse situations.
First and foremost, we have to observe the clear intention of our Lord Jesus 
Christ about faithfulness in marriage and consequently, about the indissolubility 
of marriage. But even in the biblical tradition, and in particular in St Paul’s 
First Letter to the Corinthians 7, we see how epikeia was applied to this clear 
intention. Moreover, the tradition of the Church developed not only the so-
called Privilegium Paulinum, but also the Privilegium Petrinum.
We also observe the evolution of the praxis of marriage tribunals that are 
taking more into consideration extraordinary psychological situations etc. 
Familiaris Consortio 84 calls for evaluating and respecting di#erent situations 
as a question of truth. What consequences can be drawn from this message in 
the future?
e main argument of Familiaris Consortio 84 for not admitting divorced 
and remarried Catholics to the sacraments is that the state of the divorced and 
remarried objectively contradicts the covenant of love between Christ and the 
Church symbolised and realised in the Eucharist. Nobody can deny, that there 
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is a contradiction. However, there are other contradictions, which are not 
mentioned in FC 84. For instance, there is also an objective contradiction, that 
while in the Gospels Jesus is depicted as openly sharing meals with public sinners, 
divorced and remarried Catholics are excluded from the Eucharistic meal. e 
Eucharist is the source and the summit of the whole of the Christian life (Lumen 
Gentium, 11) from which the Church lives and grows (Lumen Gentium, 26). 
Hence, it is also a contradiction, when in some parts of the Church at least 
half of the members are indistinctly excluded from the sacraments. What does 
this mean, not only for the persons concerned, but also for the growth of the 
Church? Is there a discontinuity between Jesus’ dining with the public sinners 
in the Gospels and the exclusion from the sacrament of the Eucharist of the 
divorced and remarried? 
e important argument for the absolute and indistinct exclusion of divorced 
and remarried Catholics from the Eucharist comes from sacramental theology. 
Following St omas, “sacramentum est in genere signi.” So, reasoning about 
sacraments is also reasoning about symbols. Symbols are “forms” (Gestalten) 
in a deep and rich sense that carry many levels of meaning each connected and 
referring to the others.26 Symbolic reasoning is never-ending and the symbolic 
sense of the Eucharist is too rich to be extinguished. 
It is within the logic of symbols that consequences for our life must be drawn 
in an analogical rather than univocal way. Laws must always be formulated in a 
univocal way. But the jump from analogical to univocal reasoning is a metabasis 
eis allo genos, a crossing over from one order of logic to another.
In sacramental theology we o!en speak of divine law (ius divinum). But 
the relation between divine law and human law (and even ecclesiastical law) is 
rather complex. Divine law is always embedded in human law formulations.27 
Ius divinum does not fall from the sky, like the Islamic understanding of the 
Koran as being dictated directly from Allah. Instead, divine law is always the 
word of God uttered in the words of humans (cf. 1 Tess 2:13). In our Christian 
understanding of revelation, the Divine appears not beside human situations, 
but within the human condition. 
Complex situations and problems call for di"erentiated solutions. Epikeia 
 26 Günter Virt, “Sittliches Handeln als Symbolgeschehen,” !eologische Quartalschri# 163 
(1983): 123-131; and Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. 
Denis Savage (New  Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
 27 K. W. Merks, “Göttliches Recht, menschliches Recht, Menschenrechte. Die Menschlichkeit 
des ius divinum,” Bijdragen 65 (2004): 257-283;  Avery Robert Dulles, “Ius Divinum as an 
Ecumenical Problem,” in A Church to Believe in: Discipleship and the Dynamics of Freedom (New 
York: Crossroad, 1982), 80-102.
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should be considered as helpful for such complex and o!en extraordinary 
situations. Epikeia is not a norm that goes against norms (many are anxious that 
epikeia is a contra-norm). But epikeia is the old and proven virtue to dare to act 
praeter legem in extraordinary situations. e justication for this is in St omas, 
who calls for reverting to the higher principle in extraordinary situations. e 
last canon in the Code of Canon Law specically mentions salus animarum as 
the higher principle (1752). 
When we consider all this and more, can epikeia, this oldest and o!en 
forgotten virtue, serve as a theological basis for pastoral solutions in particular 
cases - at least for the time being? 
Epikeia is not the solution for all cases and it is not a contra-norm against the 
norm, but it could be suitable to evaluate particular extraordinary cases in an 
extra-juridical way. 
eological arguments for changing marriage law are also being put forward.28 
Even if some day in the future, church law on the divorced and remarried were 
to change, epikeia would continue to be useful, because no law can include all 
the circumstances under which it is valid. Life is always richer than any law or 
regulation that can be formulated, and our God is a God of life.
 28 eodor Schneider, ed., Geschieden, Wiederverheiratet, Abgewiesen? Antworten der 
!eologie, Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. 157 (Freiburg: Herder, 1995); Schockenho%, Chancen 
zur Versöhnung?
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